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The multifaceted profile of Albanian Diaspora 
 
Albania has one of the world’s highest emigration rates, relative to its population, with 
a stock of emigrants nearly 39 per cent of the total population1. There were respectively 
437,356 Albanian legal migrants residing in Greece and 447,586 in Italy in 20152. 
The recent flow of Albanians migrants is largely made up of four main groups: i) 
labour migrants; ii) family members of migrants, or people migrating to reunite with 
their families abroad; iii) students (the number of Albanian students at Italian 
universities constitutes the biggest community of foreign students in this country)3; and 
iv) asylum-seekers and refugees. The first three groups are numerically more relevant as 
significantly larger4. 
Generally, the Albanian Diaspora is composed of the following groups which fits to 
the contemporary classification of Diasporas (Rutherford, 2009): i) lived Diaspora or 
individuals born in the home country who are currently living permanently or 
temporally in a host country; ii) ancestral Diaspora or individuals with ancestral links to 
the home country, such as second and third generations members; iii) next generation 
Diaspora or  younger members; iv) returning Diaspora or members who have lived in a 
host country and who have come back to the home country; v) affinity Diaspora or 
foreign nationals who worked or studied in the home country and have re-migrated. 
The main causes of emigration for Albanian citizens are still of economic nature, 
among which the unemployment that remains high (17.3 per cent, with a peak of 32.5 
per cent in the age group 15-29 years) and poverty (12.5 per cent of the population lives 
below the poverty line)5. This happens despite the improvement of living conditions and 
a net stable growth of the Albanian economy by 1.11 in 2013, 1.8 in 2014, 2.8 in 20156 
and about 3 in 20167 at a time of the economic crisis in destination countries and 
Europe.  
 
“Economic Asylum Seekers” growing flow: a momentum for revisiting Albanian 
migration 
 
During the last years the numbers related to Albanian citizens who applied for asylum 
in EU Member States (11,040 in 2013, 12,295 in 2014) and whose requests have been 
largely rejected/unsuccessful were growing. Beginning in early 2015, a surge of 
                                                 
1 UNDESA (2015) Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 revision (United Nations database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015), Extracted on 13 January 2016. 
2 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. 
3  Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. Rapporto annuale sulla presenza dei migranti. La 
comunità albanese in Italia (2015). 
4 IOM, Policy on Engagement with Albanian Communities Abroad 2016-2020, August 2016. 
5 INSTAT, Tirana, 2016. 
6 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AL. 
7 Ministry of Finance of Albania, Tirane, 2017. 
220  Kosta Barjaba   
“economic asylum seekers” left Albania, heading largely to Germany, Netherland and 
other Western European countries. In total, 53,805 Albanians submitted an application 
for asylum in Germany in 20158 . Albania ranked fourth in the number of asylum 
seekers to the European Union during the first quarter of 2015, according to Eurostat 
data. 
Albanian asylum seekers, particularly those directed to Germany, were encouraged by 
signals that the German government was revisiting its migration policies, looking to 
attract new foreign labor. Many Albanians called themselves “economic asylum 
seekers”, as did the media, and offered motivations including unemployment and 
poverty as reasons for leaving Albania in their asylum interviews. Indeed, almost all of 
them were labor emigrants who were self-nominated “economic asylum-seekers” as a 
tactic to be admitted in Germany and other EU member countries. Given their 
perception that Germany was seeking workers, many Albanians adopted the term 
“economic asylum seeker” as an argument to incentivize their accommodation in 
Germany. Many may have been misled by smugglers to believe this was a viable route 
to gaining residency in the European Union (Barjaba & Barjaba, 2015). 
Economic motivations are not recognized under the 1951 Geneva Convention, which 
defines a refugee as an individual persecuted or fearing persecution based on belonging 
to a political, religious, or ethnic group. In 2016 Germany added Albania, Kosovo and 
Montenegro to a list of “safe countries,” which would fast-track processing and removal 
of failed asylum seekers from those countries. 
The growing flow of self-labeled “economic asylum-seekers” is a momentum to start 
re-reflecting on the nature of Albanians’ migration flows, particularly on their 
expectations on return and the ideology of return. 
 
The failure of “Investing for children” myth 
 
Some of the myths of Albanians’ emigration at early 1990-s, were the myth of 
children’ future and that of immediate return to Homeland. Almost all emigrants 
interviewed in Greece, Italy and Germany mentioned that among the strongest pull 
factors were their desires to “ensure a better education for their children” and “make 
some money to meet their basic needs and to return to Homeland” (Barjaba, 2002; 
Barjaba, 1996). After reaching at last one of these goals, most of them confessed they 
will return back to Albania. My intention in revoking these Albanian emigrants’ 
projects is not to put into attention the timing gap between “educating the children” and 
“return to Homeland”. My hypothesis is that Albanian migration was accompanied and 
even motivated by several myths about working and living in Western countries. 
I remember that during my field work with Albanian emigrants in Greece, Italy and 
Germany, the expectation to find better schooling and educational opportunities for 
their children was a principal common concern of most of them (Barjaba & Perrone, 
1996). Democratic Albania inherited a well-structured education system from the 
previous regime. Of course, it was deeply politicized and isolated from contemporary 
scientific achievements and technological innovation in Western countries. However, 
the access to free education was a public policy implemented by communist regime. 
Free and mass education was propagated as a pride of the country, in the context of total 
isolation from the rest of the world. 
                                                 
8 EUROSTAT, 2016. 
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However, education system was deeply affected by transitional developments. The 
stature of “educated people” was soon replaced by the perception of “reach person.” 
Education was not perceived to be the best avenue towards wellbeing and social 
mobility (Barjaba, 1995a). The rate of illiteracy rapidly increased and in the mid 1990-s 
Albanian parents started to understand that country’s education system did not respond 
to their expectations. The rate of illegal and family employment of children and even 
minors increased (Barjaba, 1995b). 
In these circumstances was shaped the expectation to find better schooling and life 
opportunities for children, which characterized the motivations of first emigration flows 
from Albania. It was meaningfully articulated by their expression “We left Albania to 
ensure a better future for our children” (Barjaba, 1996). 
How this project was implemented? Almost three decades later, the second generation 
of Albanian migrants has followed the school system in destination countries. They 
have received, of course, a better education compared to that in Albania. Thousands of 
Albanian students have followed and are graduated at Western universities. However, 
the gap between expectations of the parents and education of their children is visible. 
Employment, rather than education, seems to be the life path of Albanian migrants 
second generation. In addition, most of them are employed in the periphery of labor 
market. Consequently, the myth of children education remained only a myth. 
 
The Myth of Fatherland versus delayed return 
 
Well-known Albanian migration scholars have assumed that a possible quick return 
will not be the case of Albanian migration. King and Vullentari (2012) have noticed that 
“Return is unlikely to take place on a large scale for two principal reasons. First, as 
migration matures into family settlement abroad, there is a need to sustain family 
incomes and to build an educational and career future for children which would be 
interrupted were return to take place. Second, the Albanian economic environment is 
not propitious for employment-seeking or business-minded returnees”. This hypothesis 
has been confirmed. Contrary to early Albanian emigrants’ expectations, the country 
experienced a delay in the return of successful emigrants. 
Return migration first became significant in 2005. Returnees of this stage have been 
diverse: i) emigrants who lost their job in the destination country; ii) emigrants who 
came back with a plan to invest in Albania; iii) emigrants who had gained high 
qualifications and intended to use it in their home country. 
Generally, the flow of successful returnees has been less than those who returned 
because of hardships abroad. Consequently, the ideology of return migration has mostly 
been the ideology of failure. Returnees are not always those who come back at the end 
of their migration project to invest in their country of origin; rather, they are often 
migrants with high qualifications or indeed entire families who have not found, or have 
lost, a suitable location in the foreign labour market. By returning, they make an attempt 
to establish themselves again in the homeland, while leaving it open to return to the 
country of emigration. 
The domination of failure was explicable in the conditions of the illegal emigration, 
during the first decade of Albania’s contemporary migration. After 1999, as the 
immigration legislation of Italy and Greece became more liberal and favourable, the 
rhythms of forced return started to decrease (Barjaba & King, 2005, Perrone, 1998). 
However, the increase in returned migrants started to be a trend of Albanian migration 
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after 2008. The effects of the financial crisis on the Greek and Italian economies, 
particularly stimulated return and raised challenges for individual contributions to 
Albania’s development. Between 2008 and 2014, it is estimated that 150,000 to 180,000 
emigrants returned to Albania, the majority from Greece. Albanians residing in Italy 
were also decreased by 4.6 per cent in 2015.9 Similarly, many Albanian migrants have 
returned home from Greece, and other main countries of destination, including the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland, and France. 
High rate of rejection of asylum applications by citizens of Albania also contributed to 
the return flows. 
The yearly breakdown of return figures shows the following returns by year10: 
 
Year Number of returns 
2012 14,762 
2013 20,751 
2014 20,376 
2015 25,134 
 
Most of returnees have requested governmental support to reintegrate into the 
Albanian economy and society, including social and health assistance and support for 
their children’s education. 
Only a small part of them have been able to direct their resources towards the 
country’s development. According to a 2013 IOM/INSTAT study, only 8 percent of 
returnees surveyed said they invested in at least one project. The remaining 92 percent 
said they did not invest for three main reasons: insufficient capital limiting the 
availability of financial recourses required to start a business, no prior plan to invest, 
and lack of experience and training in investment11. 
Recent researches show that there are three main motivations encouraging the 
ideology of failure of return migrants to Albania: family problems, unemployment and 
nostalgia.  Being female, not having children before departure, send goods, maintaining 
contacts and visit Albania frequently, do not investing after returning, having intentions 
to leave the country again, and returning to place of birth or residence are positively 
associated with returning for family problems. Returning for unemployment reason is 
positively related to being married as a pre-migration condition. Individuals 
appertaining to the nostalgic group are more likely to being female, not being married 
and having children before leaving the country, sent goods, maintain contacts and visit 
Albania frequently, returning to the place of birth or residence, and declaring their 
intentions to stay and not leaving the country again (García-Pereiro & Biscione, 2016).  
The researchers (Gëdeshi & Xhaferaj, 2016) have made the distinction between two 
groups of returnees. The first group was composed of economic migrants. Data suggest 
that the return intensity of this group decreased after 2014. For example, the number of 
returned migrants registered in the migration counters dropped from 1.500 persons in 
2012 to 500 in 201512. The second group was composed of Albanian failed asylum-
                                                 
9 IDOS, Statistical Dossier on Immigration, Rome, 2016. 
10 Migration profile of the Republic of Albania for the year 2016; Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2017. 
11 Return Migration and Reintegration in Albania 2013, IOM & INSTAT, Tirana, 2014. 
12 Monitoring Report of the Action Plan of the National Strategy 2010-2015 for the reintegration of the 
Albanian return migrants, Ministry of Social Welfare and Youth, National Employment Service, 2016. 
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seekers who applied mostly between 2014 and 2015, and returned in groups. Around 
3.600 asylum seekers returned from Germany in 2015 and around 3.700 in the first half 
of 2016. These numbers underscore an increasing trend of the return process of 
Albanian asylum seekers. 
From a more detailed perspective, Gëdeshi & Xhaferaj (2016) classify the returnees in 
five groups: i) unemployed; ii) employed; iii) self-employed; iv) small and medium 
investors; v) students. The first group is the most socially excluded and in emergent 
needs for employment, economic assistance and integration of children at schools. The 
second group is characterized by a higher professional level and is richer in social 
capital which has assisted them in employment. However, they are critical to quality of 
services offered in Albania. The self-employed are requiring some financial and 
technical support to start their businesses in Albania. Entrepreneurs are characterized by 
a higher level of human, financial and social capital, but require more qualitative 
business consulting and services in education and care. The returned students require 
more access to participate in economic, academic and political life of the country. 
The trend to revert to the ideology of success is also related with some positive 
features of the migration of Albanians and the collapse of the so-called “myths” about 
their emigration: the myth of demon and criminal is being replaced by the myth of 
neighbor; the myth of usurper of the jobs of the natives is being replaced by the myth of 
competitor; the myth of burden on welfare system is being replaced by the myth of 
sponsor of the system, as the Albanian emigrants contribute to the receiving countries as 
tax payers (Barjaba, 2015). 
 
Final remarks 
 
Despite its moderate character, the current return trend is partly stemming the negative 
consequences of high migration flows, such as loss of key human resources. However, 
more efforts are needed to strengthen the positive development impact of return 
migration. Many scholars (Mai, 2010; Cassarino, 2014; Barjaba, 2016) support the idea 
that the link between migration and development in Albania can be facilitated, on the 
one hand, by attracting investments and expertise of migrants and, on the other hand, by 
seeing the return migration phenomenon, not as a response to the migration problems of 
destination countries, but as part of the migration process. This could be achieved by the 
adoption of labour market and other appropriate emigrants’ engagement policies. The 
Diaspora can be a bridge to stimulate investment and trade relations abroad for 
Albanian companies as well as for institutional and private sector partnerships between 
the country of origin and the destination countries. 
In order to promote such a partnership, the country migration policies need to adopt a 
spirit of reciprocity through which Albania and Diaspora will work together for mutual 
goals. The country needs to build trust between Government and Diaspora in order to 
encourage physical or virtual return migration.  Ancestral or affinity Diaspora may not 
intend to physically return but may have an interest in helping through their financial, 
social or human capitals, skills and ideas. These capitals can be mobilized associated 
with 3E strategy: Enable, Engage, Empower. 
In addition, returnees can bring considerable labour and social innovations in the 
Albanian system and their contribution is a key to the country’s development. Returning 
migrants bring a valuable set of informal and non-formal capacities, skills and 
competencies obtained during their migration experience. A number of successful 
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transnational ventures in Albania, largely found in big cities such as Tirana, Durrës, 
Korça and Gjirokastra near the Greek border, generated by migrants mostly with 
experiences in Italy and Greece, have led to the birth of transnational networks and 
entrepreneurship among Albanian migrants (Barjaba, 2017). These ventures could be of 
great importance to the country’s development. The transnational networks should be 
supported by various policies, incentives, and resources in order to promote the 
migration-development nexus. 
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